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The Regulatory Rescue of the Welfare State 
Deborah Mabbett 
 
Abstract: The regulatory state and the welfare state can be described in terms of 
contrasting pairs of ‘types of policies’ and ‘types of politics’ following Lowi (1972).  
The paradigmatic regulatory type of policy is market coordination, and its type of 
politics is nonmajoritarian, technical and supranational. The welfare state has 
redistribution as its paradigmatic type of policy, and the dominant type of politics is 
majoritarian, party-political and national. This paper dissects these distinctions. Public 
sector reforms mean that regulatory types of policy can increasingly be found within 
welfare service provision. Different arrangements for labour market coordination are 
integral to different welfare state regimes, and at the same time these regulatory 
arrangements are concerned with combating market failure and promoting efficiency. 
There are abundant examples of technical, expertocratic policy-making within the 
welfare state and a high level of supranational policy exchange. Delegation is 
important to the institutionalisation of the welfare state, as are nonmajoritarian 
commitments to social rights, secured for example for migrants. These findings cast 
doubt on the characterisation of welfare state policy-making as  political and partisan. 
It is suggested that the interpenetration of regulatory politics enhances the robustness 
of the welfare state in the face of international market integration, while at the same 
time biasing policy towards the promotion of efficiency and suppressing the 
importance of solidaristic political values. 
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The Regulatory Rescue of the Welfare State 
 
 
For many researchers immersed in the world of regulatory governance, the very title 
of this paper poses a challenge. Surely the regulatory state is concerned with the 
operation of markets, whereas the welfare state is concerned with the redistribution of 
market output through taxing and spending? The former adopts economic efficiency 
and procedural fairness as its central norms; the latter some sort of social equality. For 
the regulatory state, rules are the central instruments of policy; for the welfare state, 
the government budget serves as the focus of policy-making and the measure of 
activity.  
This perspective on the regulatory state, defined almost in opposition to the welfare 
state, has been developed most strongly by Majone (1993) in the context of the 
development of social regulation in the EU. But it can be found in other accounts of 
the role of the regulatory state in ‘building’ markets, a role which is contrasted with 
the welfare state roles of redistribution through transfer payments and service 
provision by public bureaucracies (Sbragia 2000). Characteristic of the regulatory 
state are nonmajoritarian institutions in which technical experts search for socially-
optimal solutions; the redistributive welfare state, by contrast, is seen as the central 
policy domain of majoritarian political contestation, in which conflicting interests are 
represented and policy outcomes depend on negotiation and coalition-formation. 
The difference between the regulatory state and the welfare state can therefore be 
framed in terms of two contrasting pairs of policy area and policy process, or ‘types of 
policy’ and ‘types of politics’ (Lowi 1972: 300). The paradigmatic regulatory type of 
policy is market coordination (setting standards, combatting information asymmetries, 
ensuring access), and its type of politics is nonmajoritarian, technical and 
supranational. The welfare state pairing has tax-benefit redistribution as its 
paradigmatic type of policy, and the dominant type of politics is majoritarian, party-
political and national. 
The first two sections of this paper challenge both parts of this characterisation of the 
welfare state. Section 1 shows that the welfare state encompasses many more types of 
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policy than redistribution. In particular, welfare states are constituted as much by their 
structures of labour market regulation as by their patterns of government expenditure 
and taxation (Esping-Andersen 1990, Part 2). Of course labour market regulation is 
different to utilities or competition regulation, because it is explicitly organised 
around conflicting interests; indeed around the most politically salient class conflict: 
that between capital and labour. It is often governed by a corporatist structure of 
interest representation which stands in stark contrast to the dominance of impartial 
experts in other market-regulatory bodies. But the difference should not be overstated. 
In the late nineteenth century heyday of innovation in employment regulation, the 
‘labour question’ engaged experts and brought forth proposals for achieving socially 
optimal arrangements. These ideas find counterparts in current regulations to enhance 
efficiency in employment relationships. 
Section 2 demonstrates that characteristic features of policy-making in the regulatory 
state may also be found in the welfare state. The type of politics found in welfare 
policy-making is often technical and consensual. Once we go looking for regulatory 
policy-making, we can find numerous applications to welfare sectors. This is not just 
a matter of having a hammer and seeing nails everywhere. Regulatory techniques 
shape the way in which social policy problems are defined, in particular by 
highlighting efficiency goals but also through the international dissemination of 
norms, including rights.. The use of regulatory venues also means that social policies 
are not necessarily shaped around majoritarian political support, which may restrain 
their redistributive impact but may also mean that disadvantaged minorities are 
provided for. 
The third section turns to the supranational dimension of welfare state policy-making. 
In the era of ‘embedded liberalism’ (Ruggie 1982), organisations such as the ILO 
promoted a standard set of social policy institutions as part of a vision of how a 
modern nation state should be constituted (Meyer et al 1997). In the era of 
neoliberalism, we might expect to see the transnational dissemination of social policy 
in decline, but this is not the case. Instead, social policy is reconstituted and reappears 
in supranational domains via regulatory regimes. We find familiar social policies re-
framed as correctives to market failures in the work of organisations like the European 
Commission, the OECD and the World Bank. Also evident is an expansion in the 
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international dissemination of expressions of social rights, solidifying expectations 
that social provisions will be maintained and providing the focus for monitoring and 
analysis by ‘integrity agencies’ (Levi-Faur 2011). 
When the regulatory state and the welfare state are characterised as opposing pairs of 
policy and politics, the inference is readily drawn that the international integration of 
markets in goods and services, and the accompanying development of supranational 
regulatory institutions, is a threat to welfare states. By tracing the efficiency-
promoting content of welfare policies and the role of regulatory techniques in their 
dissemination, we gain a different understanding of the impact of supranational 
integration and can better appreciate the resilience of welfare states in the face of 
economic pressures. 
 
1. The regulatory state inside the welfare state 
In understanding the evolution of the regulatory state, the central process has been the 
wave of privatisation of state-owned enterprises that started in the 1980s and was 
rapidly diffused around the world (Levi-Faur 2005). Privatisation was accompanied 
by the establishment of a new type of regulatory body: an independent agency, staffed 
by experts and charged with creating conditions that would emulate the efficient 
outcomes of a competitive market. State-owned trading enterprises (public utilities, 
airlines, etc) were not part of the welfare state as it is conventionally understood 
(measured as government spending on welfare services and social transfer payments), 
although they pursued social mandates, particularly to do with maintaining 
employment. Their privatisation had little direct effect on the welfare state, although it 
helped to weaken the corporatist regulation of the labour market. 
Privatisation came to have a direct impact on the welfare state when governments 
moved to reform the provision of public services by involving private providers 
through ‘contracting-out’ and ‘quasi-market’ arrangements. This mode of 
privatisation differed from the privatisation of trading enterprises in that governments 
remained the major purchasers of services. Thus the size of government measured in 
financial terms (the size of the government budget) was not reduced by this type of 
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reform, although the role of government as a provider was reduced, as is reflected in 
data on public sector employment (Grout and Stevens 2003, Table 1).  
The splitting of purchasers from providers has contributed to the entry of the 
regulatory state into the welfare state, as reflected in the proliferation of regulatory 
bodies within government (Hood et al 1999).  Regulatory techniques include contracts 
that specify performance requirements and link payments to outputs, in contrast to 
previous ‘demand-driven’ financial arrangements. Competition among providers is 
promoted, and even required as a consequence of commitments to market integration 
within the EU and more widely under the GATS. New regulatory approaches have 
brought more formal systems of monitoring, benchmarking and auditing in place of 
previous reliance on professional self-government in welfare services. 
These developments have affected the ‘budgetary’ welfare state, where governments 
make transfer payments and purchase services. Welfare states are also constituted by 
characteristic patterns of labour market regulation. Esping-Andersen (1990) 
distinguished the minimal regulation (low minimum wage, limited employment 
protection) found in liberal market economies from the status-protecting regulations 
governing employment relationships in much of continental Europe and from the 
Scandinavian model of promoting equality by achieving high employment rates and a 
relatively compressed wage structure. Others have identified other regulatory 
strategies. For example Castles (1985) showed how immigration control and trade 
protection could provide the foundations of a ‘wage-earners welfare state’.  
Labour market regulation has visible and salient distributional effects, and engages 
parties (employers and unions) with clearly conflicting interests. Labour market 
regulatory bodies have generally been constituted with corporate representation of 
those interests, through the participation of organised labour and employer groups. 
Furthermore, while governments have often tried to engineer regulatory arrangements 
to secure industrial peace and to counter inflation, they have rarely been able to enter 
the fray without a high degree of politicisation attaching to their interventions. This is 
because the central cleavage in the labour market has also been the central political 
cleavage for most developed countries. Trade unions have been affiliated to the 
political left and often have close ties to left-wing governments, while employers’ 
organisations have supported right-wing governments. 
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However, there has also been a persistent efficiency-promoting dimension to labour 
market regulation. For the fledgling field of social research in the nineteenth century, 
the ‘labour question’ was the central issue. Social scientists looked for ways to 
organise and regulate the labour market, not only to restrain the growth of class 
consciousness and the rise of socialism, but also to remedy consequences of 
industrialisation that were seen as perverse and counterproductive. They did not use 
the language of ‘market failure’, but some of the phenomena that concerned them can 
be framed as such. For example, ‘sweating’ (the employment of workers for long 
hours at very low rates of pay) was driven by a disequilibriating market dynamic, 
whereby, as wages fell, desperate families supplied more and more labour 
(specifically, women and children) in order to meet their income needs. The 
implication drawn by contemporary commentators was that regulating for a ‘family 
wage’ would stabilise and equilibriate the market.  
Another recognised ‘market failure’ was that employers of wage labour had little 
incentive to ensure the long-term reproduction and maintenance of the labour force, 
once workers became mobile and were not bound to one master. Regulations 
prohibiting child labour and limiting factory work by women drew on this type of 
argument. Modern successors to this thinking are reflected in regulations to promote 
‘family-friendly’ employment. While much of the policy discourse of the time seems 
highly moralising to modern eyes, it was recognisably based on a search for policies 
that will produce ‘positive sum’ outcomes, maximising the size of national income. 
The erosion of corporatist approaches to labour market regulation - in particular, the 
decline of trade union membership and national collective bargaining – has been well-
documented (Iversen 1999). However, there remains an abundance of non-partisan 
regulation in employment, for instance through provisions on health and safety and 
gender equality (Majone 1993). A striking example arose when the 1997 Labour 
government in the UK ventured to introduce a national minimum wage. It adopted a 
technical, depoliticised solution to the question of how to set and uprate the wage, 
establishing a Low Pay Commission to make recommendations which the government 
has, since its inception in 1999, always accepted. The Commission has employer and 
union representatives but also academic members. It has actively promoted analyses 
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of the effects of the minimum wage which argue that its distributional impact on 
household income and poverty is limited, but that there are good market-regulatory 
reasons for having a minimum wage: to prevent abusive employment and to promote 
more stable and productive employment relationships (Metcalf 2008). 
These examples serve to illustrate that regulation in the labour market, while 
differently constituted in different welfare regimes, is not necessarily structured 
around politically-salient, class-conscious divides. More generally, there is no clear 
distinction between the policy areas to which regulation is applied and the policy 
areas that are salient for the classification and operation of welfare states. 
 
2. The regulatory lens on welfare state policy-
making 
The previous section has shown that ‘regulation’ as a description of a type of policy, 
in which rule-making for market transactions occurs, does not delineate a policy 
sphere which is separate from the welfare state. On the contrary, welfare states are 
partly constituted by market-regulatory arrangements, and welfare state reform 
processes are closely linked to the rise of the regulatory state. This section discusses 
the regulatory techniques used in welfare policy-making. The basic point is that 
welfare state policy-making is not always (or even mostly) a domain of politicised 
debate with high levels of public engagement. On the contrary, many areas are as 
esoteric as the finer points of the regulation of privatised utilities. Furthermore, it is 
not even obvious that redistribution is correlated with high politicisation. Groups with 
strong interests in maintaining the welfare state sometimes advocate depoliticising 
strategies, for example by pressing for automatic indexation of benefits or seeking the 
creation of an independent agency to administer provisions. 
As noted above, central to the evolution of the regulatory state has been the creation 
of independent agencies in which specialised knowledge and competence is brought 
to bear on the task of combating market failure and promoting allocative efficiency. 
Thus there are three characteristic aspects to regulatory policy-making: an 
institutional aspect (delegation out of the political arena), the use of technical 
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expertise, and the formulation of the policy problem (promoting efficiency) (Mabbett 
and Schelkle 2009). This section examines the extent to which these features are 
found in welfare state policy-making. 
The development of the social sciences saw the introduction of the analytical 
techniques that we now regard as characteristic of regulatory policy-making, notably 
the use of social statistics. Systematic counting of the population and measurement of 
its living conditions structured the analysis of social conditions and shaped the 
proposed solutions. Sociologists such as Nikolas Rose (1991) have examined how 
quantification shaped social understandings and political discourses. Rose notes the 
paradox that, while social researchers drew political attention to poverty and 
contributed to the mobilisation of public opinion, their use of statistical methods also 
‘promise[d] a “de-politicization” of politics, redrawing the boundaries between 
politics and objectivity by purporting to act as automatic technical mechanisms for 
making judgements, prioritizing problems and allocating scarce resources.’ (Rose 
1991: 674).  
Statistical analysis yielded, inter alia, the idea of social insurance, a mechanism 
whereby a class of people could raise its own security and well-being by contributing 
to a common pool, from which those affected by misfortune could draw. Ex post, 
social insurance was redistributive, but ex ante, statistical analysis demonstrated how 
such schemes could be actuarially fair. Through such processes, the political could be 
made technical. ‘Arguments about numerical quotas, availability pools and 
demographic imbalance become a substitute for democratic discussion of the 
principles of equity and justice’ (Prewitt, quoted in Rose 1991: 680).   
Whereas theories of working class mobilisation emphasise the electoral success of 
social democratic parties in explaining the origins of the welfare state (Korpi 2006), 
accounts which pay more attention to the production of social knowledge remark on 
the absence of a party-political aspect to many early welfare state-building initiatives. 
For example, Kuhnle’s (1996: 244) account of early Norwegian social policy 
highlights that ‘a common view [among participants at the time] was that social 
policymaking was or ought to be lifted above the party political struggle in 
Norway..[..]. Irrespective of party adherence, politicians met to work jointly for the 
implementation of social legislation, according to a contemporary analysis.’  
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One implication is that social programmes, far from being populist in appealing to the 
majority of the population, are often depoliticised, in the sense of being removed from 
salient class conflicts. The creation of autonomous bodies, both for policy formulation 
and for administration, can also play a part in this. Expert commissions have played a 
large role in the formulation of social policy in Scandinavia throughout recent history 
(Kuhnle 1996: 241-44). Working groups have been established to achieve cross-party 
consensus: a notable recent example is the Swedish pension reform of 1994 (Brooks 
and Weaver 2005). Other instances where independent bodies have been created to 
bring expertise to policy-making and increase the perceived security and reliability of 
social commitments include the US Social Security Administration, which manages 
earmarked social security contributions, taking it out of the domain of budgetary 
contestation (Patashnik 1997).  With the spread of quasi-markets and privatisation in 
health care, the last two decades have seen the establishment of numerous regulatory 
authorities. For example, the UK’s National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence (NICE, established in 1999) describes itself on its website as ‘an 
independent organisation responsible for providing national guidance on promoting 
good health and preventing and treating ill health’. It develops clinical guidelines on 
the most cost-effective treatments for conditions, and assesses the cost effectiveness 
of new drugs and other health technology innovations. Its German counterpart, 
AQUMED, hosts an international regulatory network called Guidelines International 
Network (GIN), established in 2002, which brings together similar agencies from 
other countries. Another network, Health Technology Assessment (HTA) 
International, includes the major pharmaceutical companies among its members as 
well as HTA regulatory bodies from sixteen countries.  
It is arguable that the whole structure of social provision in the welfare states of 
advanced countries rests on processes of rule-based delegation. Parliaments do not 
review the entitlements of individuals: they set rules instead. Direct intervention by 
politicians in determining individual benefits is generally impugned as ‘clientelism’; 
in other words, as an inappropriately high level of political engagement in the 
redistribution of resources. Delegation through rules is taken a step further in 
instances of ‘automatic government’ (Weaver 1988), for example where the 
legislature agrees on a technical scheme for uprating benefits in line with inflation. 
The use of these devices suggests that, while the welfare state can be seen as a 
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political resource for assembling constituencies and ‘buying votes’, politicians see 
limits to the potential for gaining credit by distributing benefits.  
In the best regulatory tradition, social policy agencies promulgate technical analyses 
and attempt to eliminate distributional contestation from their domain of decision-
making. One technique for the agency is to narrow and ‘partition’ the policy area, so 
that the participants in the regulatory part of the process see their task as one of 
finding efficient solutions, while the resolution of distributional issues is assigned to 
another policy process with different participants (Mabbett 2009). The idea that 
pension provision should be understood as comprised of distinct ‘pillars’ provides a 
good example of partitioning. In an influential report, the World Bank (1994: 234) 
argued that ‘a different government role is appropriate for each [pillar]’. The Bank 
advocated that the first, budgetary, pillar should be focused on redistribution, instead 
of also addressing the savings function. This meant that the functional logic of the 
budgetary pillar would conform to the institutional setting of parliamentary politics, 
which is able to make majoritarian decisions over redistribution. In the second and 
third pillars, provision would be ‘actuarially fair’ rather than redistributive, so 
governments would have a regulatory role which could be delegated to an 
independent agency. 
 
3. The international dimension 
One noticeable feature of looking at welfare state policy-making through a regulatory 
lens is that cross-national and supranational aspects are highlighted. It is characteristic 
of regulatory policy domains both that supranational networks are created and that 
policies are transferred from country to country. Privatisation and the creation of 
independent regulatory agencies exhibit striking patterns of diffusion across countries 
(Levi-Faur 2005). Welfare states also exhibit diffusion patterns in measures ranging 
from the introduction of social insurance to the adoption of welfare-to-work 
programmes. Freeman and Moran (2000) remark on the internationalisation of policy-
making in health care, for example through the international networks developed by 
pharmaceutical regulators. In pensions, the construction of a regulatory domain, 
particularly around the third pension pillar, has been accompanied by the worldwide 
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promulgation of a pension reform programme based on the World Bank’s 1994 report 
(Orenstein 2005). 
Yet it seems almost paradoxical to emphasise the cross-national and supranational 
aspect to welfare state policy-making when there is abundant evidence of the 
idiosyncracy of national welfare states. Furthermore, by contrast with market-
regulatory policy domains, where strong interests in market integration drive 
supranationalism forward, there is no obvious interest-based driver for international 
networking in social policy. Supranational communication does not come easily: 
among welfare administrators, one often finds blank-faced incomprehension of other 
countries’ procedures and a general conviction that one’s own national system is 
‘better’. This reflects the primacy of communication with clients in social policy: 
everyday ‘street level’ practice is highly localised. 
Nonetheless, there are persistent and pronounced elements of supranationalism in 
welfare state policy-making. Meyer et al (1997) give a compelling account of the 
incorporation of the welfare state into prevailing norms of what constitutes a nation 
state. Their argument is that the policies and structures that are seen as the normal 
apparatus of the nation state are constructed and propagated through global processes. 
Instead of seeing the welfare state as the organic expression of the solidarity of a 
community, they show how its characteristic features are introduced into unlikely 
social settings through the creation of distinctive state institutions, starting with the 
construction of members of the polity as ‘citizens’ with ‘rights’ and going on to the 
identification of certain categories of citizen as needy, vulnerable or deserving (Meyer 
et al 1997: 145-6). Actors engaged in building nations and achieving their recognition 
in the international system are receptive to internationally-transmitted norms about 
how a state is constituted, resulting in copying or ‘isomorphism’ of institutions across 
polities.  
International organisations play a role in this transmission mechanism, presenting 
models of government structures and policies and collecting data, which both has an 
organisational effect itself and facilitates comparison across countries. For example, 
the ILO has many of the characteristics of a supranational regulatory body. It 
formulates standards in the form of conventions, collects cross-national statistics and 
provides technical assistance. Strang and Chang (1993: 242) argue that ILO 
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conventions ‘offer a script or model that actors can draw upon to design policy’. 
Evidence for this comes from direct references to conventions in national legislation, 
along with case studies of reform processes where ILO conventions have been 
invoked. Conventions may also provide a ready-made policy rationale, to the extent 
that conformity with international standards is a reason for policy in itself. 
However, unlike the regulatory networks that have developed out of market-oriented 
reforms in recent years, the ILO has a corporatist structure, with each state sending 
trade union and employer representatives along with government officials, and it has, 
for much of its history, been affected by dissention over convention standards. 
Seekings (2008) documents how the ILO promoted the German model of social 
insurance despite Danish and British attempts to make the case for tax-financed 
systems. He also finds the ILO to have been resolutely ‘workerist’, limiting the 
relevance of its prescriptions in countries where formal employment is low. From a 
regulatory perspective it is easy to understand why the ILO was both workerist and 
social insurance-oriented. It sought to formulate prescriptions which could attract the 
support of employers as well as unions (and governments). Employers have often 
supported social insurance when benefits are confined to the contributing workforce 
and can be negotiated over as part of the remuneration package (Swenson 1991). As 
the ILO has moved away from workerism and insurance, to address problems of 
poverty more directly, it has been less and less able to achieve unanimous support for 
conventions, and its influence has waned. 
Consensual supranational policy exchanges on social policy rely on the adoption of a 
highly functionalist language, portraying the favoured policies of the day as 
promoting economic growth and development. Intergovernmental venues provide 
occasions on which states present themselves as unitary, rational and responsible. In 
these venues, states declare ‘standardized purposes like collective development, social 
justice and individual rights’, and they present themselves as having ‘policy 
technologies for the rational means-ends accomplishment of goals’ (Meyer et al 1997: 
153).  Activities in these venues often appear de-coupled from the political realities of 
national policy-making, raising a basic question about how important supranational 
policy-making is. Guiraudon (1998) has addressed this question in a study of the 
influence of supranationalism on the granting of social rights to migrants. The puzzle 
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is that migrants generally do have social rights, yet political pressures in national 
venues would often point to the denial of access to welfare for migrants. One 
explanation for this is that governments comply with supranational agreements, 
suggesting that participation in supranational venues shapes the way that rights are 
structured in the welfare state.  
It is well-known that the EU requires its members not to discriminate against other 
countries’ nationals in their social provisions, but this is often seen as an alien 
imposition of the EU regulatory state that undermines national welfare states 
(Leibfried 2005, Ferrera 2005). Guiraudon suggests that EU regulation is part of a 
wider process whereby ‘international institutions and transnational actors were able to 
diffuse shared understandings about the treatment of foreigners so as to change and 
shape the views of domestic state and societal actors’ (1998: 280). Forensically 
tracing through how these norms are transmitted, Guiraudon draws a distinction 
between open and closed policy domains. ‘The impact of international-level variables 
should be strongest when domestic pressure is low and debate is contained within the 
gilded doors of official buildings.’ (1998: 286). Foreigners’ rights have been protected 
when the policy debate has been kept closed; opening the debate and widening 
publicity on the issue tends to be detrimental to the status of foreigners (1998: 290). 
Guiraudon argues that immigrants’ rights are subject to a political cycle, threatened 
near to elections as politicians make populist appeals, but secured after elections when 
political time horizons are longer. Just as regulatory institutions for monetary policy 
can be seen as dampening the political business cycle in the interests of economic 
stability and growth, so one can see the embedding of rights as a counterweight to 
political opportunism that will tend to produce more social stability and cohesion in 
the long term. 
It is striking that Guiraudon’s account portrays ‘rights language’ as a depoliticising 
strategy, given that rights claims are also used to mobilise identity groups, as reflected 
in women’s rights and disability rights campaigns. The relationship between rights 
and the characteristic patterns of regulatory policy-making remains an open question. 
There are obvious differences between rights claims and regulatory proposals: for 
example, the former tend to be made and mediated by lawyers, whereas the latter are 
dominated by economists. However rights claims, particularly when promulgated at 
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the international level, have a striking capacity to reframe policy issues in a way that 
shifts them away from domestic political contestation. While social rights are claims 
on resources which will be exercised in competition with other claims, their 
formulation avoids the frame of redistribution. For example, Strang and Chang 
suggest that ILO conventions on workers’ rights shift policies symbolically ‘out of the 
realm of zero-sum, partisan politics and into the realm of fundamental, universally-
recognised rights’ (1993: 242-3). This suggests that supranational communication has 
a depoliticising function: if a claim can be formulated in a way that can be understood 
in international fora, it is by that very process transformed from being a redistributive 
claim into a proposition about the legitimacy of the state itself. 
The wider implication is that the ‘redistributiveness’ of a policy is not an inherent 
structural feature, as it might be understood by an economist calculating winners and 
losers, but a construction which depends on the policy domain in which resources are 
being claimed. A claim exercised in the tax or benefit system is therefore instantly 
classifiable as redistributive, even if it might have positive-sum aspects (such as 
facilitating a person’s return to work, or maintaining macroeconomic stability by 
preventing home owners defaulting on their mortgages). Conversely, a claim made in 
the international arena is not made in the realm of partisan politics, and thereby 
escapes partisan political scrutiny. 
 
Conclusion 
One conclusion from this discussion is, by now, a familiar one. Market-regulatory 
policies reach deep into the heart of the welfare state, and the supranational regulation 
of market integration has pronounced implications for social policy, even while its 
proponents seek to preserve national welfare state competences. Majone’s account of 
regulatory legitimacy as derived from solving ‘positive sum’ problems and staying 
away from redistributive issues does not describe the current state of affairs in the EU 
(as Majone 2005 indeed acknowledges). The supranational regulatory state is directly 
implicated in policy-making in the welfare state, exerting a strong impact on welfare 
state ideas and institutions. For many commentators, this development is (a) 
undemocratic and (b) likely to have a detrimental effect on levels of redistribution, 
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since these depend on national processes which produce solidarity. This conclusion 
considers these two concerns in turn.  
One response to the first concern is to question the value attached to majoritarian 
democracy. This is the position taken by many advocates of social rights, who see 
them as countering the flaws of national political systems, and providing the basis for 
a more robust deliberative democracy (Fredman 2008). It is argued that 
nonmajoritarian strategies such as the promulgation of rights are not necessarily 
undemocratic, if one has a more ambitious definition of democracy than the current 
mode of government in developed western states. Rose, having documented the role 
of statistical measurement and technique in the foundation of the welfare state, also 
implicitly criticises the reification of existing democracies, arguing that they are 
already too reliant on regulatory techniques for the exercise and justification of power, 
specifically on technologies for measuring, monitoring and controlling social entities 
(1991: 691). Students of social policy might draw a different implication: that the 
development of the welfare state does not have to be reliant on majoritarian rule; that 
socially-excluded minorities who lack political as well as economic power might 
nonetheless receive fair(ish) allocations of public goods and social services in existing 
democracies because of the responsiveness of public policy to social research. This 
would help to explain the ongoing engagement of  researchers and policy activists 
with surveying, measuring and publicising poverty and exclusion. 
A different defence of the regulatory state against the claim that it is undemocratic can 
be formulated as follows. Presently-existing democracies are organised around states, 
but choices made by citizens in these states are constrained by the policies of other 
states. Thus many of the policies that citizens might support cannot be adopted 
without resolving collective action problems between states. If supranational 
regulation can overcome these problems and organise international collective action, 
the result is more empowering of national democracy, not less. This type of argument 
would be most convincing if supranational regulation could be shown to prevent ‘race 
to the bottom’ dynamics in welfare provision. Critics argue that it does not do so 
because it has a market-integrative bias (Scharpf 1999). The era of embedded 
liberalism is over: market integration is no longer constrained by the quest to 
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safeguard domestic stability (cf. Ruggie 1982: 393). In the era of neoliberalism, the 
welfare state is trampled under the forward march of global capitalism. 
The analysis of regulatory capitalism challenges the claim that we have entered a 
neoliberal era marked by the decline of public authority, replaced by the rule (or 
misrule) of anonymous markets. Instead, it is argued that states and other collective 
actors reconstitute market relationships in the course of formulating regulations to 
promote efficiency and manage risk. One implication is that the loss of redistributive 
capacity that comes with market integration can be at least partially countered by the 
reconstitution of social policy as efficiency-enhancing policy, through the use of 
regulatory techniques. Efficiency explanations can be ‘discovered’ for large parts of 
the welfare state: for example, companies incur lower health care costs in the social 
insurance systems of Europe than in the private insurance system of the US, and thus 
reconcile competitiveness and distributional fairness. Welfare-to-work programmes 
aim to reform social assistance provision into ‘productive’ policies, and so on.  
Jonah Levy (1999) has pointed out that west European welfare states, in particular, 
seem to have a large potential for ‘vice into virtue’ reforms, whereby efficiency and 
distributional fairness can both be enhanced by suitably-designed measures. However, 
he also notes that these reforms are accompanied by an erosion of the political 
salience of the welfare state. ‘With welfare expansion giving way to restructuring and 
retrenchment, leftist governments have lost their most prized policy instrument’ 
(1999: 239-40). Rather than wishing to retain control of instruments of social policy, 
seeing them as valuable political resources for satisfying domestic constituencies, the 
politics of vice-into-virtue may call for downplaying distributional conflicts, for 
consensus-formation and blame avoidance. 
The argument is a familiar one from the literature on the politics of retrenchment, 
which postulates that the welfare state has gone from being a resource for national 
politics, allowing parties to mobilise their supporters behind proposals and ‘buy in’ 
key groups, to a burden on governments which they manage at least in part through 
delegation strategies (Pierson 1996). One implication is that governments have little 
reason to resist the regulatory takeover of the welfare state, and may even facilitate it 
as a mechanism for reforming and reducing fiscal burdens and allowing them to shift 
political contestation to more tractable domains. Furthermore, the domestic popularity 
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of market-oriented social policy reforms suggests that welfare states are not simply 
victims of wider processes; on the contrary, domestic sources of pressure for welfare 
state reform contribute to the active engagement of governments in regulatory state-
building and its extension into welfare policy areas (Iversen and Wren 1998).  
This paper has argued that social policy is reconstituted in the regulatory state as a 
technical domain of efficiency-enhancing policy. This reconstituted policy domain is 
certainly less open to political contestation and less inviting as a flagship of left-wing 
politics than its predecessor. Some readers may feel that the processes described here 
are not so much rescue as capture, imprisoning the welfare state in a narrow 
normative frame that consolidates its role as handmaiden of capital and undermines 
other value bases. It remains that social programmes and expenditures have largely 
survived the intensified processes of market integration that have occurred in the last 
few decades, and identifying the affinities between the regulatory state and the 
welfare state helps to explain how. 
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